THING AS THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LONDON SCHOOL
STYLISTICS: A PROLEGOMENA TO A LONGER
NOTE.
As a phrase, 'a sense of things' can designate the sensation of thingness. It can also
designate meaning, or the understanding (often the intuitive discernment) of an existing
set of relations ("Sir, do you have a sense of things" "What's your sense of things?"). It is
the convergences of, or the disjunctures between, that sensation and that understanding
(between the senses and our cognitive sense-making) that serve as the focal points of my
reading (Brown 17).
In an earlier paper, Brown raises the question of the need for theory: "Do we
really need a theory of things like we need a theory of narrative, cultural theory,, queer
theory or discourse theory"? (Critical Inqiry 28, 2001, 1-22). Like many other fugitive
categories we use in literary criticism, "irony," "meaning," "genre," and the like I would
suggest that the usefulness of a theory for "thing," for the reader/critic, must first be
constrained by a clear definition, a distinct context, and some way to deal with the
problems with the verb "is" (or one of its other forms).
May the facts be with us.
What I propose here is an suggested addemdum to the current understanding of
ThingASTheory, also its paradoxes, by first a look at some of the implications of Brown's
statement that "thing" can be seen as "the understanding (often the intuitive discernment)
of an existing set of relations ('Sir, do you have a sense of things' ''What's your sense of
things?'). By "set of relations" I take to mean typically the contexts we can expect "thing"
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to be at home inin both a syntactical and semantic sense and as well in a congruent
ontological one.
The contexts I have in mind are 1) The London School Stylistics; 2) Proper
Function; 3) Private/Public; 4) Wittgenstein's theory of "family resemblance"; 5) The
language of economicsor a brief thought experiment on a possible context; 6) There is
no reason to look, as we have done traditionally—and dogmatically—for one, essential
core in which the meaning of a word is located and which is, therefore, common to all
uses of that word. We should, instead, travel with the word’s uses through “a complicated
i

network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (PI 66). Family resemblance also

serves to exhibit the lack of boundaries and the distance from exactness that characterize
different uses of the same concept. Such boundaries and exactness are the definitive traits
of form—be it Platonic form, Aristotelian form, or the general form of a proposition
adumbrated in the Tractatus. It is from such forms that applications of concepts can be
deduced, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein now eschews in favor of appeal to
similarity of a kind with family resemblance.
reference to salient concepts employed by London School Stylistics, namely (1) negation
in both the realm of language and non-existence in the realm of things; (2) "motivated
prominence," or the identification of what's at stake with this or that use (or absence of
use) of ThingASTheory in any given contextall this by a close reading of its
grammatical structure; (3) ThingASTheory in the context of proper function, a normative
concept of what "thing" should do, as opposed to what it can, and does, doa plow can,
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for example, function as an ornament in one's front lawn but that is not, obviously, its
proper function in performing the act of turning the earth to prepare it for seeding.
The first problem, it seems to me, with "thing theory," as a lexical set with
ontological critical implications, is the presupposition of "as," "thing AS theory." A
solution to the problem of how "thing" might, in all cases, refer to the same thing as
"theory" is either fuzzy, or lacking altogether. It is lacking because we take typically the
reference of "thing" as being to physical, concrete objects, and "theory" as referring to
mental events, like metaphors and analogies, as an understanding of referring to the
existence, an 'is,' of something perceptual, findable, verifiable. If X and Y refer to the
same thing, then isn't it true to say that X and Y converge on the same thing? The answer,
of course, is no. We may know that there is some kind of convergence going on between
X and Y, but we may have no idea how or why they converge. The awesome
representative power of "is" (as well as the other forms of "to be) can mislead us in the
same way the ancient mind:body relationship problem does or the problem of God, as
both ens and essentia, existence and essence, knowable in itself or by the "account" of the
other (Aquinas).
A second problem, or aporia, with any lexical set, like ThingASTheory, two or
more words, is the liminal space between "thing" and "theory." As we cross from one
space, that of thing to that of theoryas we do in crossing the threshold of a door we
alter our perception, the movement of our body (hands, face, posture) and most of all our
awareness of difference in all its forms as the effects of negation, what is not there; what
could be there (expectation) what was remembered there and so on. The effect is not
unlike the narrative of The Odyseey in which Odysseus exits, and later enters, the
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everyday (to him) life of Ithaca as well as (during his journey home) the liminal spaces
leading into the alien, fantastic and virtual (?) spaces of Circe, Cyclops, Land of the
Lotus Eaters, Calypso and others. Time, movement, change are all the substance of
liminal spaces, in language, perception of difference and the noticed and unnoticed
transformation of things in everyday life.
Here we might want to call on the help of etymology, or origin (if known) and the
history of "thing" and "theory" as well as that of "definition." It will perhaps turn out that
the reader doesn't see much help here in making what is aporeticc into making it
"porous," or possibly transparent. But she or he might find, as I do that etymology has
pedagogical value in opening students minds to a seldom taught "Thought-Category" and
neglected heuristic (Curtius; see also Buck)
With "definition" we are always in its "shadows," a definition of "definition." One
of these shadows is the etymology of "definition." The etymologies of certain key terms
appear, for example, when Odysseus, after twenty years of roaming, see his old father
again, he tells him that the comes from a "field of woe" (Alybas); that his name is
Eperitos (struggle, or strife) and that he is the offspring of Apheidas Polypemonides, a
"hard-scrabble life." Pindar interprets Themistios as themba ispia, or "sailspreader" and
Aeschylus reads Helen's function in her name. In the Cratylus, Plato raises the question:
do names have a "natural," by nature name," or do they originate by convention? With
Sterne's Tristram Shandy, we assume that "Tristram" refers to "sadness" and with
Gulliver to "gullibility." Walter, the father of Tristram wanted the name of his newborn
son to be "treismagistus," or thrice great. But Susaannah, charged to carry the name to
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Tristram's christening, inadventently delivered it to the priest as "Tristram." (Curtius 49597).
Names, in short, can potentially speak of the history, experience, and essence of
he, she or what bears the name. So, with "definition," we can read (or let it speak) of
setting of boundaries," from Old French definicion, from Latin definitionem (nominative
definitio), noun of action from past participle stem of definire.from 1640s; meaning "a
statement of the essential nature of something" is from late 14c.; the special focus on
words developed after c. 1550. Meaning "degree of distinctness of the details in a
description or picture" (OED. See also "definition" in Online Etymological Dictionary.
On a closer reading, de- speaks of "out of," "get rid of," "away from," etc. and "finish,"
"put an end to," "aporia," "blockage," "stoppage," etc. Expressed as a game, "definition"
characterizes the difference between a finite and an infinite event. A finite game, for
example, has a beginning, middle and end and employs players who freely enter the game
with the purpose of winning. An infinite game has players. But they don't play to win.
They only play to continue to play in a boundless, open, space. (Carse).
Existence and essence, in brief, can, in part, be known by the origin (if known) of
a lexical set.
The etymology of "thing" is from the Proto-Germanic *thingam "assembly"
(source also of Old Frisian thing "assembly, council, suit, matter, thing"; through Middle
Dutch dinc "court-day, suit, plea, concern, affair, thing," Dutch ding "thing," Old High
German ding "public assembly for judgment and business, lawsuit" terms presupposing
"affair, matter, thing," Old Norse þing "public assembly"). The Germanic word is perhaps
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literally "appointed time," from a PIE *tenk- (1), from root *ten- "stretch," perhaps on
notion of "stretch of time for a meeting or assembly."
"Theory" is said to be from Late Latin theoria (Jerome), from Greek theoria
"contemplation, speculation; a looking at, viewing; a sight, show, spectacle, things
looked at," from Greek theorein "to consider, speculate, look at," from theoros
"spectator," from thea "a view,"" possibly from PIE root *wer- (4) "to perceive"
To see, in the sense of an epistemic belief, the potential in something, the capacity
to become actual. .
ding an sich Kant. The thing cannot be solely understood by perception or reason. it can
only be known, like God, the Soul, Cosciousness, through faith.

I contradict myself? Well, the
But first a brief look at the aporetic, fugitive, nature of ThingASTheory.
here is a modified reductio ad absurdum on thing AS theory, one which takes the form of
exhibiting the self-defeating character of functions of things. You think, don't you, that I
am thinking of Occam's Razor, don't you? No chance. Well, maybe.
A procedure I find useful, at least in a pedagogical context, is initially taking a
negative approach to "thing," asking what the term cannot perform as a lexical set. This,
in essence, equates with identifying what context "thing" cannot occupy, what is
unacceptable. So please consider the following sequence: "The thing is…"; "the things
things say," (Lamb); "things things do"; "the things things feel";
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n I contradict myself. Walt Whitman.
A second, more substantial, "shadow" of "definition" is context, the container of
the object contained.

itself often a fugitive concept, and the impossibility of determining how, and why,
distinct concepts, expressed as lexical sets (mind/body; truth/falsity; feel/see and the like)
converge on the same object.
I begin with writing the first sentenceand trusting to Almighty God for the
second (Tristram Shandy 8:540)in this case, the first, next paragraph and the next after
because, in part, I write with a computer not a quill pen.

I propose we do a London School Stylistics close reading of Sterne's 226 uses of
"thing" (I take a peek at the 107 uses of the plural "things" at the end of this essay)the
purpose being to discover, or stumble upon, the name and nature of the convergence, and
later emergence, of the purpose of thing as theory.
Brown's question, "why do we need theory," is a good one, even given the
pluripotency of the term. We get a 'feel" for its significance by considering its etymology
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(as a thought-category), its function in the dual realms of negation in language and in the
realm of non-existencethat is, what is not theory? What does it not refer to?

So what is the London School Stylistics?
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There is no reason to look, as we have done traditionally—and dogmatically—for one,

essential core in which the meaning of a word is located and which is, therefore, common
to all uses of that word. We should, instead, travel with the word’s uses through “a
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (PI 66). Family
resemblance also serves to exhibit the lack of boundaries and the distance from exactness
that characterize different uses of the same concept. Such boundaries and exactness are
the definitive traits of form—be it Platonic form, Aristotelian form, or the general form of
a proposition adumbrated in the Tractatus. It is from such forms that applications of
concepts can be deduced, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein now eschews in favor of
appeal to similarity of a kind with family resemblance.
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